limited [to the District] . Cf. . Lower court United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit . Media. As to the denial of access to the social records, the Court of Appeals stated that "the statute is ambiguous." While the Juvenile Court judge may, of course, receive ex parte analyses and recommendations from his staff, he may not, for purposes of a decision on waiver, receive and rely upon secret information, whether emanating from his staff or otherwise. Therefore, the Judge has consulted with the Chief Judge and other judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with the United States Attorney, with representatives of the Bar, and with other groups concerned and has formulated the following criteria and principles concerning waiver of jurisdiction which are consistent with the basic aims and purpose of the Juvenile Court Act. at 384, 343 F.2d at 253. . He may be detained, but only until he is 21 years of age. He held no hearing. Counsel, together with petitioner's mother, promptly conferred with the Social Service Director of the Juvenile Court. 119 U.S.App.D.C. Cf. The statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to determine, in isolation and without the participation or any representation of the child, the "critically important" question whether a child will be deprived of the special protections and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act. 348, 308 F.2d 303 (1962). 4. Pee v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. We hold that it does not. Cf. (a) The Juvenile Court's latitude in determining whether to waive jurisdiction is not complete. D.C.Code § 11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. (Emphasis supplied.) [Footnote 28] (Emphasis supplied.) [Footnote 6]". While it indicated that, "in some cases, at least," a useful purpose might be served "by a discussion of the reasons motivating the determination," id. Appointment of counsel without affording an opportunity for hearing on a "critically important" decision is tantamount to denial of counsel. It did note, as another panel of the same court did a few months later in Black and Watkins, that the determination of whether to transfer a child from the statutory structure of the Juvenile Court to the criminal processes of the District Court is "critically important." In Edwards v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. . . After Mrs. Cook filed a complaint, Gault and a friend, Ronald Lewis, were arrested and taken to the Children’s Detention Home. Because the State is supposed to proceed in respect of the child as parens patriae, and not as adversary, courts have relied on the premise that the proceedings are "civil" in nature, and not criminal, and have asserted that the child cannot complain of the deprivation of important rights available in criminal cases. . (e) Since petitioner is now 21, and beyond the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, the order of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the District Court are vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court for a hearing de novo, consistent with this opinion, on whether waiver was appropriate when ordered by the Juvenile Court. The Court of Appeals permitted withdrawal. Kent v. United States. Black, supra, we do not consider it appropriate to grant this drastic relief. 368, 262 F.2d 465 (1958). Star Athletica, L.L.C. Decided by Warren Court . According to a letter from the Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's of April 5, 1962, the hospital's staff found that petitioner was "suffering from mental disease at the present time, Schizophrenic Reaction, Chronic Undifferentiated Type," that he had been suffering from this disease at the time of the charged offenses, and that, "if committed by him [those criminal acts] were the product of this disease." 7. (b) The parens patriae philosophy of the Juvenile Court "is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness." This is what the Court of Appeals itself held in Watkins. 47, 274 F.2d 556 (1959). Following Kent’s sentencing, he appealed the waiver issue among other issues to the D.C. of Health. IV, 1965). Petitioner was arrested at the age of 16 in connection with charges of housebreaking, robbery and rape. The authority of Wilhite, however, is substantially undermined by other, more recent, decisions of the Court of Appeals. Morris A. Kent, Jr. versus United States. 76 Stat. (1961); S.Rep.No.841, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. It also appears that the District Court requested and obtained the Social Service file and the probation staff's report of September 8, 1961, and that these were made available to petitioner's counsel. . 6. . D.C.Code § 11-929 (1961), now, without substantial change, § 11-1586 (Supp. of the child. Held: The Juvenile Court order waiving jurisdiction and remitting petitioner for trial in the District Court was invalid. Prosecutors then indicted Kent as an adult. Fifth Circuit Circuit Court Of Appeals. See Handler, op. The Juvenile Court judge did not rule on these motions. It, "assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a 'full investigation.'". The provision reads as follows: "If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offense which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order, such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult; or such other court may exercise the powers conferred upon the juvenile court in this subchapter in conducting and disposing of such cases. at 176, 295 F.2d at 163. Juvenile Court officials interviewed Kent from time to time during the probation period, and accumulated a "Social Service" file. The Court's ruling ushered in an era of reform in the juvenile legal system that granted increasing constitutional protections to minors. His interrogation proceeded from about 3 p.m. to 10 p.m. the same evening. 174, 177-178, 295 F.2d 161, 164-165 (1961). Myron G. Ehrlich: Yes sir, may it please the Court. See also McDaniel v. Shea, 108 U.S.App.D.C. . It is set forth in the 383 U.S. 541app|>Appendix. . Although not all such factors will be involved in an individual case, the Judge will consider the relevant factors in a. specific case before reaching a conclusion to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for trial under the adult procedures of that Court. [Footnote 33] Accordingly, we vacate the order of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to the District Court for a hearing de novo on waiver, consistent with this opinion. The court is admonished by the statute to give preference to retaining the child in the custody of his parents "unless his welfare and the safety and protection, of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without . Petitioner is in St. Elizabeth's Hospital for psychiatric treatment as a result of the jury verdict on the rape charges. He was then aged 14. A knowledge of the Judge's criteria is important to the child, his parents, his attorney, to the judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, to the United States Attorney and his assistants, and to the Metropolitan Police Department, as well as to the staff of this court, especially the Juvenile Intake Section. Fri, 11/27 - Netherlands vs. United States. . United States Supreme Court. Those cases were decided by different panels of the Court of Appeals from that which decided the present case, and, in view of our grant of certiorari and of the importance of the issue, we consider it necessary to resolve the question presented instead of leaving it open for further consideration by the Court of Appeals. . The fact that the Juvenile Court stands in a parental, rather than criminal adversarial, role with regard to a juvenile does not mean that the Juvenile Court can make arbitrary decisions. As Justice Fortas stated in the Court’s opinion, sometimes juveniles get the worst of both worlds. All States have juvenile court systems. They are not given the procedural rules given to adult criminals, yet the juvenile system is unable to provide the kind of care and rehabilitation they should receive as young people deserving of rehabilitation.
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